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Further Analysis on Public-Good Provision in a Repeated-Game Setting
Keisuke Kawachi and Hikaru Ogawa
FinanzArchiv / Public Finance Analysis
Vol. 62, No. 3 (September 2006), pp. 339-352
Published by: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40913119
Page Count: 14
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Public goods, Tax rates, Economic models, Taxes, Economic externalities, Group size, Tax incentives, Modeling, Economic competition, Economic modeling
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In a model of privately provided public goods within a repeated-game setting, Pecorino (1999) shows that it is not only possible to maintain cooperation, but it is "easy" in a large economy. Models of privately provided public goods are closely related to interregional tax competition models with spillovers in public-good provision. This paper reexamines the argument of Pecorino in an infinitely repeated interaction model of interregional tax competition. The results show that in a large economy, while the trigger strategy supports the efficient tax rate if there exists substantial spillover of public goods, it fails to do so if there are few benefit spillovers.
FinanzArchiv / Public Finance Analysis © 2006 Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG