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The buck-passing account of value: lessons from Crisp
S. Matthew Liao
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 151, No. 3 (December 2010), pp. 421-432
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40926834
Page Count: 12
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T. M. Scanlon's buck-passing account of value (BPA) has been subjected to a barrage of criticisms. Recently, to be helpful to BPA, Roger Crisp has suggested that a number of these criticisms can be met if one makes some revisions to BPA. In this paper, I argue that if advocates of the buck-passing account accepted these revisions, they would effectively be giving up the buck-passing account as it is typically understood, that is, as an account concerned with the conceptual priority of reasons or the right vis-à-vis value or the good. I conclude by addressing some of the broader implications of my arguments for the current debate about the buckpassing account of value.
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition © 2010 Springer