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Temporal Parts and Timeless Parthood
Eric T. Olson
Vol. 40, No. 4 (Dec., 2006), pp. 738-752
Published by: Wiley
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4093986
Page Count: 15
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Mereology, Philosophical object, Statues, Munchausen syndrome by proxy, Proxy reporting, Proxy statements, Preliminary proxy material, Time perception, Instantiation, Temporality
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What is a temporal part? Most accounts explain it in terms of timeless parthood: a thing's having a part without temporal qualification. Some find this hard to understand, and thus find the view that persisting things have temporal parts-four-dimensionalism-unintelligible. T. Sider offers to help by defining temporal parthood in terms of a thing's having a part at a time. I argue that no such account can capture the notion of a temporal part that figures in orthodox four-dimensionalism: temporal parts must be timeless parts. This enables us to state four-dimensionalism more clearly.
Noûs © 2006 Wiley