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Some Market Power Implications of the Shipping Act of 1984: A Case Study of the U.S. to Pacific Rim Transportation Markets
Wesley W. Wilson and Kenneth L. Casavant
Western Journal of Agricultural Economics
Vol. 16, No. 2 (December 1991), pp. 427-434
Published by: Western Agricultural Economics Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40982766
Page Count: 8
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The Shipping Act of 1984 represents a new attempt to balance the benefits of a conference (cartel) system against its costs. This legislation may have increased conference market power by streamlining the regulatory process and expanding antitrust immunity. Alternatively, the legislation may have decreased conference market power by providing for the Mandatory Right to Independent Action and Service Contracts. We develop and estimate an econometric model and find that any increased market power is offset by competitive provisions when those competitive provisions apply. However, when those provisions do not apply, the Act may increase market power.
Western Journal of Agricultural Economics © 1991 Western Agricultural Economics Association