You are not currently logged in.
Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:
Voting Games, Indifference, and Consistent Sequential Choice Rules
J. S. Banks and G. A. Bordes
Social Choice and Welfare
Vol. 5, No. 1 (1988), pp. 31-44
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41105882
Page Count: 14
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Trajectories, Games, Mathematical functions, Voting paradox, Economic theory, Voting behavior, Social choice, Rational choice theory, Majority voting, Ambivalence
Were these topics helpful?See somethings inaccurate? Let us know!
Select the topics that are inaccurate.
Preview not available
We present four choice functions which characterize the stationary points of sequential search rules derived from a preference relation over outcomes. These functions are contrasted with others in the literature in terms of narrowness of choice as well as their ability to satisfy certain normative and consistency conditions, and it is shown how two of these sets arise as the set of equilibrium outcomes of a voting game under different tie-breaking assumptions.
Social Choice and Welfare © 1988 Springer