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Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games

T. Börgers
Social Choice and Welfare
Vol. 8, No. 1 (February 1991), pp. 65-78
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41105972
Page Count: 14
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Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games
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Abstract

This paper studies the question whether there are nondictatorial procedures for collective decision making which ensure that collective decisions are Pareto-efficient if all agents choose strategies that are not weakly dominated. It is shown that contrary to what one might expect the answer is not entirely negative.

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