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An extended formulation of Arrow's theorem for k-social welfare functions
Wataru Naitou and Takahiro Watanabe
Social Choice and Welfare
Vol. 12, No. 3 (June 1995), pp. 215-224
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41106127
Page Count: 10
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Past studies in social choice theory are generally based on the assumption that any two alternatives must be incompatible. We are concerned with the concept, "k-social choice" based on the assumption that just k alternatives out of p (1 < k < p — 1) are compatible. The purpose of this paper is to show an extended formulation of Arrow's theorem for k-social welfare functions.
Social Choice and Welfare © 1995 Springer