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Information efficiency and majority decisions
Social Choice and Welfare
Vol. 12, No. 4 (October 1995), pp. 363-370
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41106142
Page Count: 8
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Communities, Expected utility, Voting, Voting behavior, Efficiency decisions, Information economics, Political debate, Nash equilibrium, Electorate, Majority rule
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The analysis is concerned with the characterization of equilibria of a two-stage voting game involving private information acquisition. Rational ignorance and information efficiency are identified. It turns out that information efficiency is not always desirable. By restricting the payoff domain, we are able to characterize completely the set of equilibria. In this case, information acquisition by few voters benefits a majority, or even the whole community.
Social Choice and Welfare © 1995 Springer