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Information efficiency and majority decisions

Hans Gersbach
Social Choice and Welfare
Vol. 12, No. 4 (October 1995), pp. 363-370
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41106142
Page Count: 8
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Information efficiency and majority decisions
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Abstract

The analysis is concerned with the characterization of equilibria of a two-stage voting game involving private information acquisition. Rational ignorance and information efficiency are identified. It turns out that information efficiency is not always desirable. By restricting the payoff domain, we are able to characterize completely the set of equilibria. In this case, information acquisition by few voters benefits a majority, or even the whole community.

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