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Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods

Lars-Gunnar Svensson and Pär Torstensson
Social Choice and Welfare
Vol. 30, No. 2 (February 2008), pp. 181-196
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41107873
Page Count: 16
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Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
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Abstract

This paper characterizes strategy-proof social choice functions (SCFs), the outcome of which are multiple public goods. Feasible alternatives belong to subsets of a product set A₁ x · · · x A m . The SCFs are not necessarily "onto", but the weaker requirement, that every element in each category of public goods A k is attained at some preference profile, is imposed instead. Admissible preferences are arbitrary rankings of the goods in the various categories, while a separability restriction concerning preferences among the various categories is assumed. It is found that the range of the SCF is uniquely decomposed into a product set B₁ x · · · x B q , in general coarser than the original product set, and that the SCF must be dictatorial on each component B₁. If the range cannot be decomposed, a form of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem with a restricted preference domain is obtained.

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