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Intergovernmental negotiation, willingness to compromise, and voter preference reversals

Maria E. Gallego and David Scoones
Social Choice and Welfare
Vol. 36, No. 3/4, Political Economy of Elections and Bargaining (April 2011), pp. 591-610
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41108143
Page Count: 20
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Intergovernmental negotiation, willingness to compromise, and voter preference reversals
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Abstract

A policy is the outcome of negotiations between two three-party parliamentary states. An election in jurisdiction A determines the composition of the legislature that selects a representative to negotiate an intergovernmental policy agreement with the representative from the legislature of jurisdiction B. Negotiations are modeled using Nash (Econometrica 18(2):155-162, 1950) bargaining framework. With heterogeneous parties, agreements and electoral outcomes depend on the concavity of the utility functions of negotiators and on the relative location of their ideal policies, i.e., depend on the negotiators relative willingness to compromise. Agreements between the bargainers may not follow the ordering of the parties' ideal policies. An electoral outcome where support for the center party comes from extreme voters may emerge.

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