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Some Reasons Why There Can't Be Any Some-Any Rule
Vol. 45, No. 3 (Sep., 1969), pp. 608-615
Published by: Linguistic Society of America
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/411442
Page Count: 8
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This paper presents evidence that semantic notions-such as presupposition, speaker's and hearer's beliefs about the world, and previous discourse-must be taken into account in a complete treatment of the distribution of some and any in conditional, negative, and interrogative sentences. Syntactic conditions alone will not account for the fact that, in certain sentence types, the two forms occur with different meanings.
Language © 1969 Linguistic Society of America