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The New Leibniz's Law Arguments for Pluralism

Bryan Frances
Mind
Vol. 115, No. 460 (Oct., 2006), pp. 1007-1021
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4121880
Page Count: 15
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The New Leibniz's Law Arguments for Pluralism
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Abstract

For years philosophers argued for the existence of distinct yet materially coincident things by appealing to modal and temporal properties. For instance, the statue was made on Monday and could not survive being flattened; the lump of clay was made months before and can survive flattening. Such arguments have been thoroughly examined. Kit Fine has proposed a new set of arguments using the same template. I offer a critical evaluation of what I take to be his central lines of reasoning.

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