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Testing Whether Field Auction Experiments Are Demand Revealing in Practice
Jay R. Corrigan and Matthew C. Rousu
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Vol. 33, No. 2 (August 2008), pp. 290-301
Published by: Western Agricultural Economics Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41220628
Page Count: 12
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Recent evidence suggests that participants' misunderstanding of experimental auction mechanisms can systematically bias auction results. We present a simple technique for testing whether field auction participants fully understand the demandrevealing nature of the auction mechanism and, by extension, whether auction bids provide an unbiased estimate of participants' willingness to pay.
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics © 2008 Western Agricultural Economics Association