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Testing Whether Field Auction Experiments Are Demand Revealing in Practice

Jay R. Corrigan and Matthew C. Rousu
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Vol. 33, No. 2 (August 2008), pp. 290-301
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41220628
Page Count: 12
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Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Testing Whether Field Auction Experiments Are Demand Revealing in Practice
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Abstract

Recent evidence suggests that participants' misunderstanding of experimental auction mechanisms can systematically bias auction results. We present a simple technique for testing whether field auction participants fully understand the demandrevealing nature of the auction mechanism and, by extension, whether auction bids provide an unbiased estimate of participants' willingness to pay.

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