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REPLY TO WARD

Richard Double
Behaviorism
Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall, 1989), pp. 159-160
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41236098
Page Count: 2
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Abstract

In "Philosophical Functionalism" (Behaviorism, 1989), Andrew Ward claims that my "The Computational Model of the Mind and Philosophical Functionalism" (Behaviorism, 1987) begs the question against philosophical functionalism by assuming that sensations possess nonrelational characteristics that cannot be explained in functional terms. In this reply I point out that my argument does not claim this, but only the much weaker premise that sensations appear to have such characteristics. I then show how the latter is strong enough to discredit philosophical functionalism.

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