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Why property dualists must reject substance physicalism
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 157, No. 1 (January 2012), pp. 61-76
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41406961
Page Count: 16
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Property dualism, Substance dualism, Physicalism, Bundle theory, Immaterial substance, Mind, Dualism, Qualia, Cartesianism, Philosophy of mind
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I argue that property dualists cannot hold that minds are physical substances. The focus of my discussion is a property dualism that takes qualia to be sui generis features of reality.
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition © 2012 Springer