Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

The Genesis of Hi-Worlds: Towards a Principle-Based Possible World Semantics

Cheng-Chih Tsai
Erkenntnis (1975-)
Vol. 76, No. 1 (January 2012), pp. 101-114
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41417603
Page Count: 14
  • Download ($43.95)
  • Cite this Item
The Genesis of Hi-Worlds: Towards a Principle-Based Possible World Semantics
Preview not available

Abstract

A Leibnizian semantics proposed by Becker in 1952 for the modal operators has recently been reviewed in Copeland's paper The Genesis of Possible World Semantics (Copeland in J Philos Logic 31:99–137, 2002), with a remark that "neither the binary relation nor the idea of proving completeness was present in Becker's work". In light of Frege's celebrated Sense-Determines-Reference principle, we find, however, that it is Becker's semantics, rather than Kripke's semantics, that has captured the true spirit of Frege's semantic program. Furthermore, for Kripke's possible world semantics to fit in Frege's framework of senses, worlds and referents, it will have to be thoroughly reformulated. By introducing the notion of a hi-world into the picture, we manage to keep the key ingredients of Becker's semantics intact, while at the same time solve a fatal problem that used to shadow Becker's original semantics—it had not been able to make sense of inhomogeneous modality. The resulting generalized Beckerian semantics provides, in effect, a Beckerian analysis of the Kripkean possible worlds. It reveals the subtle hierarchical internal structure of a Kripkean world that has not been discovered before.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[101]
    [101]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
102
    102
  • Thumbnail: Page 
103
    103
  • Thumbnail: Page 
104
    104
  • Thumbnail: Page 
105
    105
  • Thumbnail: Page 
106
    106
  • Thumbnail: Page 
107
    107
  • Thumbnail: Page 
108
    108
  • Thumbnail: Page 
109
    109
  • Thumbnail: Page 
110
    110
  • Thumbnail: Page 
111
    111
  • Thumbnail: Page 
112
    112
  • Thumbnail: Page 
113
    113
  • Thumbnail: Page 
114
    114