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Cynicism and Morality

Samantha Vice
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Vol. 14, No. 2, BSET Conference 2009 (April 2011), pp. 169-184
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41472582
Page Count: 16
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Cynicism and Morality
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Abstract

Our attitude towards cynicism is ambivalent: On the one hand we condemn it as a character failing and a trend that is undermining political and social life; on the other hand, we are often impressed by the apparent realism and honesty of the cynic. My aim in this paper is to offer an account of cynicism that can explain both our attraction and aversion. After defending a particular conception of cynicism, I argue that most of the work in explaining the fault of cynicism can be done by referring not to the cynic's beliefs about humanity, but to the attitude cultivated as a response to that belief. This attitude is hostile to the virtues of faith, hope and charity, upon which relationships and our sense of moral community depend. In conclusion, I suggest that holding the cynical belief is itself immoral, and that cynicism is disrespectful and destructive of morality.

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