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Evidence does not equal knowledge

Aaron Rizzieri
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 153, No. 2 (March 2011), pp. 235-242
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41487628
Page Count: 8
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Evidence does not equal knowledge
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Abstract

Timothy Williamson has argued that a person S's total evidence is constituted solely by propositions that S knows. This theory of evidence entails that a false belief can not be a part of S's evidence base for a conclusion. I argue by counterexample that this thesis (E = K for now) forces an implausible separation between what it means for a belief to be justified and rational from one's perspective and what it means to base one's beliefs on the evidence. Furthermore, I argue that E = K entails the implausible result that there are cases in which a well-evidenced belief necessarily can not serve as evidence for a further proposition.

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