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Relative Performance as a Strategic Commitment Mechanism

Nolan Miller and Amit Pazgal
Managerial and Decision Economics
Vol. 23, No. 2 (Mar., 2002), pp. 51-68
Published by: Wiley
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4150439
Page Count: 18
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Relative Performance as a Strategic Commitment Mechanism
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Abstract

Can managers' personality traits be of use to profit maximizing firm owners? We investigate the case where managers have a variety of attitudes toward relative performance that are indexed by their type. We consider two stage games where profit maximizing owners select managers in the first stage, and these managers, knowing each other's types, compete in a duopoly game in the second stage. The equilibria of various types of competition are derived and comparisons are made to the standard case where managers are profit maximizers. We show that managers' types can be used as a strategic commitment device that can increase firm profits in certain environments.

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