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LE PARADOXE ÉNONCIATIF ENDOPHASIQUE ET SES PREMIÈRES SOLUTIONS FICTIONNELLES
No. 132, La parole intérieure (DÉCEMBRE 2001), pp. 96-105
Published by: Armand Colin
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41559016
Page Count: 10
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Two solutions are usually given to the obvious paradox of inner speech (why does the self speak to the self?): either one stresses the cognitive function of inner speech and the part it plays in mental processes, or one considers that it corresponds to an internal representation of a self-to-other discoursesituation. In the first case, inner speech is considered as properly monological; in the second, it is only a specific case of the dialogical situation that is always to be looked for whenever speech appears. In this article, we show that these contradictory solutions of the enunciative paradox of inner speech are not only to be found in theoretical works (Husserl, Guillaume, Benveniste, Bakhtine, Derrida...), but also in fictional interior monologues: the analyse here is based on two short stories published in July and August 1927 (by Jean Schlumberger and Emmanuel Berl), that bring to light all the linguistic consequences of apparently strictly enunciative choices.
Langue Française © 2001 Armand Colin