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Reply to Roderick T. Long, "Reference and Necessity: A Rand-Kripke Synthesis" (Fall 2005): The 'Grotesque' Dichotomies Still Unbeautified

Gregory M. Browne
The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies
Vol. 8, No. 1 (Fall 2006), pp. 123-142
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41560340
Page Count: 20
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Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Reply to Roderick T. Long, "Reference and Necessity: A Rand-Kripke Synthesis" (Fall 2005): The 'Grotesque' Dichotomies Still Unbeautified
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Abstract

This essay strongly affirms, rather than denies, continuity of reference across theory change, while reconciling this with other claims made in the book Necessary Factual Truth, and in addition defends the book's claim that all non-disjunctive qualities common to the paradigms are essential to a kind, discusses its arguments against truth by convention, and denies that its attempt to show Newton's axioms necessary is a priori, rejecting the a priori altogether.

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