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The Decline of Antitrust Enforcement
Review of Industrial Organization
Vol. 19, No. 1 (August 2001), pp. 49-53
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41799024
Page Count: 5
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American Antitrust policy has abandoned tight restrictions on mergers and on a variety of business practices, such as vertical restraints in distribution. I argue that the change is permanent for three reasons: 1) rising skepticism about government intervention generally, 2) lack of deleterious effects from the new policy, and 3) increasing irrelevance of antitrust in global markets. Due process considerations will reinforce the change in policy. New technologies may, however, revive traditional antitrust concern with price fixing.
Review of Industrial Organization © 2001 Springer