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Generic Entry into the Regulated Spanish Pharmaceutical Market
Iván Moreno-Torres, Jaume Puig-Junoy and Joan-Ramon Borrell
Review of Industrial Organization
Vol. 34, No. 4 (June 2009), pp. 373-388
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41799428
Page Count: 16
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Pharmaceutical preparations, Market prices, Prices, Patents, Generic drugs, Drug regulation, Price regulation, Reference price systems, Industrial regulation, Incumbents
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This paper empirically analyses entry by generic firms into the strictly regulated Spanish pharmaceutical market. We estimate a fixed effects negative binomial entry model using a panel of 77 active ingredient markets during the period 1999-2005. The results show that generic entry depends positively on revenues, the age of the market, and the number of previous brand-name competitors, and negatively on the number of generic incumbents. We also find that regulation may drive out competition since, contrary to what policy makers might expect, the system of reference pricing restrains generic entry.
Review of Industrial Organization © 2009 Springer