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Aristotle on the Best Good: Is "Nicomachean Ethics" 1094a18-22 Fallacious?
Peter B. M. Vranas
Vol. 50, No. 2 (2005), pp. 116-128
Published by: Brill
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182772
Page Count: 13
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The first sentence of NE I.2 has roughly the form: "If A [there is a universal end] and B (because, if not-B, then C), then D [this end will be the best good]". According to some commentators, Aristotle uses B to infer A; but then the sentence is fallacious. According to other commentators, Aristotle does not use B (until later on); but then the sentence is bizarre. Contrary to both sets of commentators (but following Wedin 1981), I suggest that Aristotle uses B together with A to infer validly that there is a non-instrumental -- and thus unique -- universal end (hence D). On this interpretation the above two problems disappear, but a subtler problem emerges: not-B does not entail C.
Phronesis © 2005 Brill