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Inclusion versus Exclusion: Political Institutions and Welfare Expenditures

Markus M. L. Crepaz
Comparative Politics
Vol. 31, No. 1 (Oct., 1998), pp. 61-80
DOI: 10.2307/422106
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/422106
Page Count: 20
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Inclusion versus Exclusion: Political Institutions and Welfare Expenditures
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Abstract

Not all veto points are created equal. Collective and competitive veto points disperse political power with opposite distributional consequences. A pooled time series/cross-sectional analysis of eighteen countries from 1965 to 1986 provides strong evidence that collective veto points tend to buoy welfare expenditures and lead to higher degrees of decommodification, while the reverse is true of competitive veto points. Consensual political institutions also affect welfare expenditures and decommodification positively, while majoritarian systems tend to depress them. Thus, competitive veto points tightly restrain governmental action, while collective veto points enable government.

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