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Presidents, Ruling Parties, and Party Rules: A Theory on the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America

Javier Corrales
Comparative Politics
Vol. 32, No. 2 (Jan., 2000), pp. 127-149
DOI: 10.2307/422394
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/422394
Page Count: 23
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Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Presidents, Ruling Parties, and Party Rules: A Theory on the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America
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Abstract

The most important struggle in the politics of economic reform implementation is between the executive and ruling party, not among the state, social groups, and opposition parties. Economic reforms dislocate the relation between executive and ruling party; the executives' response determines the reforms' outcome. When the executive accommodates ruling parties, as in Argentina and Mexico, implementation is more likely than when it neglects them, as in Venezuela and Paraguay. However, accommodation produces gaps in the reform agenda. Paradoxically, market reforms in Latin America have prospered only as a consequence of illiberal lacunae.

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