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Game Theory Models with Instrumentally Irrational Players: A Case Study of Civil War and Sectarian Cleansing

Mark K. Tomass
Journal of Economic Issues
Vol. 31, No. 2 (Jun., 1997), pp. 623-632
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4227215
Page Count: 10
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Game Theory Models with Instrumentally Irrational Players: A Case Study of Civil War and Sectarian Cleansing
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