Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

Game Theory Models with Instrumentally Irrational Players: A Case Study of Civil War and Sectarian Cleansing

Mark K. Tomass
Journal of Economic Issues
Vol. 31, No. 2 (Jun., 1997), pp. 623-632
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4227215
Page Count: 10
  • More info
  • Cite this Item
If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
Game Theory Models with Instrumentally Irrational Players: A Case Study of Civil War and Sectarian Cleansing
Preview not available

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
623
    623
  • Thumbnail: Page 
624
    624
  • Thumbnail: Page 
625
    625
  • Thumbnail: Page 
626
    626
  • Thumbnail: Page 
627
    627
  • Thumbnail: Page 
628
    628
  • Thumbnail: Page 
629
    629
  • Thumbnail: Page 
630
    630
  • Thumbnail: Page 
631
    631
  • Thumbnail: Page 
632
    632