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The Political Economy of Fishing Regulation: The Case of Chile

JULIO PEÑA-TORRES
Marine Resource Economics
Vol. 12, No. 4 (Winter 1997), pp. 253-280
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/42629203
Page Count: 28
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The Political Economy of Fishing Regulation: The Case of Chile
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Abstract

This paper analyzes how government action in Chilean fisheries has evolved over the last five decades, explaining why it followed the course it did. Weaknesses in the enforcement of access restrictions and recommended catch quotas are discussed. An in-depth study of the late 1980s reform of Chilean fisheries law allows us to discuss the relevance of information problems, distributional conflicts, and lobbying pressures from organized interest groups, when attempts are made to enforce more stringent quota policies. The legislation resulting from the late 1980s reform process is consistent with regulatory capture effects. Overall, this paper adds evidence about the reasons for a prolonged persistence of inefficient institutional arrangements at marine industrial fisheries, in spite of increasingly scarce common-pool resources.

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