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SCIENCE, SUFFICIENT GROUND, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF METAPHYSICS

George A. Blair
Dialectica
Vol. 14, No. 1, Discussion sur I'idée d'une philosophie d'inspiraion scientifique (15. 3. 1960), pp. 53-79
Published by: Wiley
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/42964304
Page Count: 27
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SCIENCE, SUFFICIENT GROUND, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF METAPHYSICS
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Abstract

The scientist's basic question, « What is going on ? » shows that he finds an apparent unintelligibility in nature, and that he cannot accept nature as unintelligible. He therefore discovers or reasons to a state of affairs which will render his Peculiarity intelligible. In his theory he may assert the existence of entities, even those unobservable in principle, because he knows there must be in nature something with at least the properties necessary to account for the observed facts. But science is too specific to answer all « What is going on ? » questions, and therefore there ought to be a more generalized science, metaphysics, which would employ a generalization of scientific method.

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