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Talking About Intentional Objects
Vol. 60, No. 2 (2006), pp. 135-144
Published by: Wiley
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/42970899
Page Count: 10
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Tim Crane has recently defended the view that all intentional states have objects, even when these objects do not exist. In this note I first set forth some crucial elements of Crane's view: his reasons for accepting intentional objects, his rejection of certain ways of thinking about them, and his distinction between the 'substantial' and the 'schematic' notion of an object. I then argue that while Crane's account successfully explains what intentional objects are not, it leaves unexplained how it could make sense to say that intentional objects need not exist. Finally I propose that we can do justice to Crane's reasons for talking about intentional objects by re-interpreting talk about intentional objects as talk about the truth-or satisfaction-conditions of intentional states.
Dialectica © 2006 Wiley