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El escéptico como despertador para sueños en tercera persona

Manuel de Pinedo and Hilan Bensusan
Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía
Vol. 28, No. 1 (2009), pp. 68-74
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/43046765
Page Count: 7
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Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
El escéptico como despertador para sueños en tercera persona
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Abstract

Frente al peligro de que una dependencia excesiva en la noción de virtud anule la responsabilidad del sujeto epistémico y el carácter personal del conocimiento, abrazamos algunos aspectos de la argumentación de Sosa en A virtue epistemology y cuestionamos otros. Recomendamos, finalmente, una concepción holista y falibilista del conocimiento. An excessive reliance on the notion of virtue may eliminate the responsibility of the epistemic subject and, with it, the personal character of knowledge. To avoid this danger, we embrace some aspects of Sosa's argumentation in A virtue epistemology while questioning others, in order to recommend a holistic and fallibilist conception of knowledge.

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