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THÉORIES DE L'ACTION ET NORMATIVITE CHEZ ADAM SMITH ET CHEZ JOHN C. HARSANYI

Andréa Fernandes and Feriel Kandil
Cahiers d'économie politique / Papers in Political Economy
No. 33 (1998), pp. 137-159
Published by: L'Harmattan
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/43111540
Page Count: 23
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THÉORIES DE L'ACTION ET NORMATIVITE CHEZ ADAM SMITH ET CHEZ JOHN C. HARSANYI
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Abstract

Pour rendre compte du comportement rationnel d'ordre éthique, Harsanyi reprend la figure du spectateur impartial de Smith. Or, des différences significatives apparaissent, entre les deux auteurs, concernant le traitement du jugement moral. Chez Harsanyi, il s'agit d'un jugement déterminant qui part d'une connaissance mathématique des préférences morales et évalue quantitativement les conséquences des actions. Chez Smith, le jugement réfléchissant du spectateur impartial opère de manière approximative, par analogie et induction. Derrière les deux formes de jugement, se confrontent deux modèles d'action et deux conceptions différentes des rapports entre les actes économiques et la morale. Harsanyi's account of the rational ethical behaviour refers explicitly to A. Smith's mecanism of the impartial spectator. A comparison between the two authors shows important differences concerning the impartial spectator's moral judgement. In Harsanyi's case, it is a determinant judgement that calculates the consequences of actions according to moral preferences. For Smith, the impartial spectator operates in an analogical manner to evaluate the actor's motives in specific situations. lt is a reflective judgement, in Kant's sens. The article delves into the different conceptions of actions and relations between morals and economics that lie between these two kinds of judgement.

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