Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.

LA CAMPAGNA DI RUSSIA NEL QUADRO STRATEGICO DELLA GUERRA FASCISTA

Lucio Ceva
Il Politico
Vol. 44, No. 3 (SETTEMBRE 1979), pp. 420-446
Published by: Rubbettino Editore
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/43208520
Page Count: 27
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
LA CAMPAGNA DI RUSSIA NEL QUADRO STRATEGICO DELLA GUERRA FASCISTA
Preview not available

Abstract

Since 1924 the Fascist government alternated with great nonchalance, both in the propaganda sand in the political action, the various themes of anti-communism and anti-sovietism. The Italian military leaders, however, never pondered over the weight of the U.S.S.R. in European strategy At the outbreak of the German-Russian conflict in June 1941, Italy is in the utmost military confusion: unable to sustain the war against the British with her only forces, she is, besides, quite unaware of what lies behind the certain aid the Germans give her in the Mediterranean. However, Mussolini, against Hitler's advice and that of the most sagacious Italian military leaders, orders to send to Russia an army corps in 1941 and an army of 10 divisions in 1942, only equipped with the modern artilleries the Country has at its disposal. These and other war equipments will have little weight on the fight against the U.S.S.R. whereas they could prove more useful in the North-African campaign where, till Autumn 1942, even modest changes in the forces have sometimes locally important consequences. The influence of such decision is examined with precise reference to the evolution of the African-Mediterranean war in 1941 and 1942. The reasons for the choice are political; by participating so ostentatiously in the Russian campaign the dictator hopes to make the world, or the Italian people (or perhaps only himself) believe that he is the first ally of the Reich on a level footing. At first the objections of the Italian military staff are due to the hope of a better use in the Mediterranean. Later on, however, the wish prevails not to send out of the Country war material that allow to overthrow Mussolini and become reconciled to the United Nations imposing however an internal social order very similar to the one guaranteed by the Fascist dictatorship for 20 years.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
420
    420
  • Thumbnail: Page 
421
    421
  • Thumbnail: Page 
422
    422
  • Thumbnail: Page 
423
    423
  • Thumbnail: Page 
424
    424
  • Thumbnail: Page 
425
    425
  • Thumbnail: Page 
426
    426
  • Thumbnail: Page 
427
    427
  • Thumbnail: Page 
428
    428
  • Thumbnail: Page 
429
    429
  • Thumbnail: Page 
430
    430
  • Thumbnail: Page 
431
    431
  • Thumbnail: Page 
432
    432
  • Thumbnail: Page 
433
    433
  • Thumbnail: Page 
434
    434
  • Thumbnail: Page 
435
    435
  • Thumbnail: Page 
436
    436
  • Thumbnail: Page 
437
    437
  • Thumbnail: Page 
438
    438
  • Thumbnail: Page 
439
    439
  • Thumbnail: Page 
440
    440
  • Thumbnail: Page 
441
    441
  • Thumbnail: Page 
442
    442
  • Thumbnail: Page 
443
    443
  • Thumbnail: Page 
444
    444
  • Thumbnail: Page 
445
    445
  • Thumbnail: Page 
446
    446