If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

Is Skepticism about Self-Knowledge Coherent?

Gary Ebbs
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 105, No. 1 (Jul., 2001), pp. 43-58
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321172
Page Count: 16
  • Download PDF
  • Cite this Item

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
Is Skepticism about Self-Knowledge Coherent?
Preview not available

Abstract

In previous work I argued that skepticism about the compatibility of anti-individualism with self-knowledge is incoherent. Anthony Brueckner is not convinced by my argument, for reasons he has recently explained in print. One premise in Brueckner's reasoning is that a person's self-knowledge is confined to what she can derive solely from her first-person experiences of using her sentences. I argue that Brueckner's acceptance of this premise undermines another part of his reasoning - his attempt to justify his claims about what thoughts our sincere utterances of certain sentences would express in various possible worlds. I describe a weird possible world in which a person who uses Brueckner's reasoning ends up with false beliefs about what thoughts her sincere utterances of certain sentences would express in various possible worlds. I recommend that we reject Brueckner's problematic conception of self-knowledge, and adopt one that better fits the way we actually ascribe self-knowledge.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[43]
    [43]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
44
    44
  • Thumbnail: Page 
45
    45
  • Thumbnail: Page 
46
    46
  • Thumbnail: Page 
47
    47
  • Thumbnail: Page 
48
    48
  • Thumbnail: Page 
49
    49
  • Thumbnail: Page 
50
    50
  • Thumbnail: Page 
51
    51
  • Thumbnail: Page 
52
    52
  • Thumbnail: Page 
53
    53
  • Thumbnail: Page 
54
    54
  • Thumbnail: Page 
55
    55
  • Thumbnail: Page 
56
    56
  • Thumbnail: Page 
57
    57
  • Thumbnail: Page 
58
    58