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Is Skepticism about Self-Knowledge Coherent?
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 105, No. 1 (Jul., 2001), pp. 43-58
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321172
Page Count: 16
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Skepticism, Self knowledge, Modal realism, Reasoning, Water consumption, Earth, Words, Thought experiments, Liquids, Fact stipulations
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In previous work I argued that skepticism about the compatibility of anti-individualism with self-knowledge is incoherent. Anthony Brueckner is not convinced by my argument, for reasons he has recently explained in print. One premise in Brueckner's reasoning is that a person's self-knowledge is confined to what she can derive solely from her first-person experiences of using her sentences. I argue that Brueckner's acceptance of this premise undermines another part of his reasoning - his attempt to justify his claims about what thoughts our sincere utterances of certain sentences would express in various possible worlds. I describe a weird possible world in which a person who uses Brueckner's reasoning ends up with false beliefs about what thoughts her sincere utterances of certain sentences would express in various possible worlds. I recommend that we reject Brueckner's problematic conception of self-knowledge, and adopt one that better fits the way we actually ascribe self-knowledge.
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition © 2001 Springer