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Reasoning and Representing

Mark Eli Kalderon
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 105, No. 2 (Aug., 2001), pp. 129-160
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321177
Page Count: 32
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Reasoning and Representing
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Abstract

I argue that logical understanding is not propositional knowledge but is rather a species of practical knowledge. I further argue that given the best explanation of logical understanding some version or another of inferential role semantics must be the correct account of the determinants of logical content.

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