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Against "A Posteriori" Moral Naturalism

David Barnett
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 107, No. 3 (Feb., 2002), pp. 239-257
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321224
Page Count: 19
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Against "A Posteriori" Moral Naturalism
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Abstract

"A posteriori" Moral Naturalism posits "a posteriori" moral/naturalistic identities. Versions of this view that posit necessary identities purport to rely on the Kripke/Putnam doctrine of scientific essentialism. Versions that posit only contingent identities require that moral terms are non-rigid designators. I argue that metaethics does not fall within the scope of scientific essentialism and that moral terms are not non-rigid designators.

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