Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

Against "A Posteriori" Moral Naturalism

David Barnett
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 107, No. 3 (Feb., 2002), pp. 239-257
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321224
Page Count: 19
  • Download ($43.95)
  • Cite this Item
Against "A Posteriori" Moral Naturalism
Preview not available

Abstract

"A posteriori" Moral Naturalism posits "a posteriori" moral/naturalistic identities. Versions of this view that posit necessary identities purport to rely on the Kripke/Putnam doctrine of scientific essentialism. Versions that posit only contingent identities require that moral terms are non-rigid designators. I argue that metaethics does not fall within the scope of scientific essentialism and that moral terms are not non-rigid designators.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[239]
    [239]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
240
    240
  • Thumbnail: Page 
241
    241
  • Thumbnail: Page 
242
    242
  • Thumbnail: Page 
243
    243
  • Thumbnail: Page 
244
    244
  • Thumbnail: Page 
245
    245
  • Thumbnail: Page 
246
    246
  • Thumbnail: Page 
247
    247
  • Thumbnail: Page 
248
    248
  • Thumbnail: Page 
249
    249
  • Thumbnail: Page 
250
    250
  • Thumbnail: Page 
251
    251
  • Thumbnail: Page 
252
    252
  • Thumbnail: Page 
253
    253
  • Thumbnail: Page 
254
    254
  • Thumbnail: Page 
255
    255
  • Thumbnail: Page 
256
    256
  • Thumbnail: Page 
257
    257