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Can There Be Brute, Contingent Moral Facts

John H. Dreher
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 108, No. 1/2, Selected Papers Presented in 2001 at the 75th Annual Meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association (Mar., 2002), pp. 23-30
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321232
Page Count: 8
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Can There Be Brute, Contingent Moral Facts
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that whether or not a world is good can be a contingent fact about the world that is not dependent upon that world's natural facts, or, indeed, upon any other facts. If so, the property, good, does not supervene upon the facts of nature (or upon any other facts). My argument for this claim is that it is possible to view the very world in which we live (viz. the natural facts that constitute it) as good and to view it as bad.

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