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Perceptual Knowledge Derailed

J. Schaffer
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 112, No. 1 (Jan., 2003), pp. 31-45
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321325
Page Count: 15
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Perceptual Knowledge Derailed
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Abstract

The tracking theory treats knowledge as counterfactual covariation of belief and truth through a sphere of possibilities. I argue that the tracking theory cannot respect perceptual knowledge, because perceptual belief covaries with truth through a discontinuous scatter of possibilities. Perceptual knowledge is subject to inner derailing: there is an inner hollow of perceptual incompetence through which the differences are too small to track. Perceptual knowledge is subject to outer derailing: there are outlying islands of perceptual competence that extend well past skeptical sinkholes.

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