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Reasons Explanations and Pure Agency
Richard Feldman and Andrei A. Buckareff
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 112, No. 2 (Jan., 2003), pp. 135-145
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321333
Page Count: 11
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We focus on the recent non-causal theory of reasons explanations of free action proffered by a proponent of the agency theory, Timothy O'Connor. We argue that the conditions O'Connor offers are neither necessary nor sufficient for a person to act for a reason. Finally, we note that the role O'Connor assigns to reasons in the etiology of free actions results in further conceptual difficulties for agent-causalism.
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition © 2003 Springer