You are not currently logged in.
Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:
Reasons Explanations and Pure Agency
Richard Feldman and Andrei A. Buckareff
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 112, No. 2 (Jan., 2003), pp. 135-145
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321333
Page Count: 11
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Desire, Musical agency, Syntactical antecedents, Pubs, Free will, Causation, Causal theory, Acting, Counterexamples, Causality
Were these topics helpful?See somethings inaccurate? Let us know!
Select the topics that are inaccurate.
Preview not available
We focus on the recent non-causal theory of reasons explanations of free action proffered by a proponent of the agency theory, Timothy O'Connor. We argue that the conditions O'Connor offers are neither necessary nor sufficient for a person to act for a reason. Finally, we note that the role O'Connor assigns to reasons in the etiology of free actions results in further conceptual difficulties for agent-causalism.
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition © 2003 Springer