Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

Reasons Explanations and Pure Agency

Richard Feldman and Andrei A. Buckareff
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 112, No. 2 (Jan., 2003), pp. 135-145
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321333
Page Count: 11
  • Get Access
  • Download ($43.95)
  • Cite this Item
If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
Reasons Explanations and Pure Agency
Preview not available

Abstract

We focus on the recent non-causal theory of reasons explanations of free action proffered by a proponent of the agency theory, Timothy O'Connor. We argue that the conditions O'Connor offers are neither necessary nor sufficient for a person to act for a reason. Finally, we note that the role O'Connor assigns to reasons in the etiology of free actions results in further conceptual difficulties for agent-causalism.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[135]
    [135]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
136
    136
  • Thumbnail: Page 
137
    137
  • Thumbnail: Page 
138
    138
  • Thumbnail: Page 
139
    139
  • Thumbnail: Page 
140
    140
  • Thumbnail: Page 
141
    141
  • Thumbnail: Page 
142
    142
  • Thumbnail: Page 
143
    143
  • Thumbnail: Page 
144
    144
  • Thumbnail: Page 
145
    145