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Are Truth and Reference Quasi-Disquotational?

Ray Buchanan
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 113, No. 1 (Mar., 2003), pp. 43-75
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321348
Page Count: 33
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Are Truth and Reference Quasi-Disquotational?
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Abstract

In a number of influential papers, Hartry Field has advanced an account of truth and reference that we might dub quasi-disquotationalism. According to quasi-disquotationalism, truth and reference are to be explained in terms of disquotation and facts about what constitute a good translation into our language. Field suggests that we might view quasi-disquotationalism as either (a) an analysis of our ordinary truth-theoretic concepts of reference and truth, or (b) an account of certain other concepts that improve upon our ordinary concepts. In this paper, I argue that (i) if the view is understood along the lines of (a) it fails, and (ii) if it is construed along the lines of (b) it is, at best, under-motivated.

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