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Presentism and the Non-Present

Matthew Davidson
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 113, No. 1 (Mar., 2003), pp. 77-92
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321349
Page Count: 16
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Presentism and the Non-Present
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that presentism has a problem accounting for the truth of statements whose truth conditions seem to require there be relations that hold between present and non-present objects. I motivate the problem and then examine several strategies for dealing with the problem. I argue that no solution is forthcoming, and this presents a prima facie problem for presentism.

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