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Free Will, Chance, and Mystery

L. Ekstrom
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 113, No. 2 (Mar., 2003), pp. 153-180
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321354
Page Count: 28
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Free Will, Chance, and Mystery
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Abstract

This paper proposes a reconciliation between libertarian freedom and causal indeterminism, without relying on agent-causation as a primitive notion. I closely examine Peter van Inwagen's recent case for free will mysterianism, which is based in part on the widespread worry that undetermined acts are too chancy to be free. I distinguish three senses of the term 'chance.' I then argue that van Inwagen's case for free will mystrianism fails, since there is no single construal of the term 'change' on which all of the premises of his argument for free will-causal indeterminism incompatibilism are true. By use of a particular event-causal indeterminist account of free action, I support the case for free will-indeterminism compatibilism.

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