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An Objection to Attitudinal Hedonism

Peter De Marneffe
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 115, No. 2 (Aug., 2003), pp. 197-200
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321399
Page Count: 4
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An Objection to Attitudinal Hedonism
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Abstract

This article argues that attitudinal hedonism is false as a theory of what is intrinsically good for us because it implies that nothing is intrinsically good for someone who does not have the psychological capacity for the propositional attitude of enjoyment even if he has other important mental capacities that humans have.

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