Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

Physical Constituents of Qualia

István Aranyosi
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 116, No. 2 (Nov., 2003), pp. 103-131
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321417
Page Count: 29
  • Download ($43.95)
  • Cite this Item
Physical Constituents of Qualia
Preview not available

Abstract

In this paper I propose a defense of a posteriori materialism. Problems with a posteriori identity materialism are identified, and a materialism based on composition, not identity, is proposed. The main task for such a proposal is to account for the relation between physical and phenomenal properties. Composition does not seem to be fit as a relation between properties, but I offer a peculiar way to understand property-composition, based on some recent ideas in the literature on ontology. Finally, I propose a materialist model for the mind-body relation that is able to resist the attack from conceivability arguments.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[103]
    [103]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
104
    104
  • Thumbnail: Page 
105
    105
  • Thumbnail: Page 
106
    106
  • Thumbnail: Page 
107
    107
  • Thumbnail: Page 
108
    108
  • Thumbnail: Page 
109
    109
  • Thumbnail: Page 
110
    110
  • Thumbnail: Page 
111
    111
  • Thumbnail: Page 
112
    112
  • Thumbnail: Page 
113
    113
  • Thumbnail: Page 
114
    114
  • Thumbnail: Page 
115
    115
  • Thumbnail: Page 
116
    116
  • Thumbnail: Page 
117
    117
  • Thumbnail: Page 
118
    118
  • Thumbnail: Page 
119
    119
  • Thumbnail: Page 
120
    120
  • Thumbnail: Page 
121
    121
  • Thumbnail: Page 
122
    122
  • Thumbnail: Page 
123
    123
  • Thumbnail: Page 
124
    124
  • Thumbnail: Page 
125
    125
  • Thumbnail: Page 
126
    126
  • Thumbnail: Page 
127
    127
  • Thumbnail: Page 
128
    128
  • Thumbnail: Page 
129
    129
  • Thumbnail: Page 
130
    130
  • Thumbnail: Page 
131
    131