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The Presentist's Dilemma

Ulrich Meyer
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 122, No. 3 (Feb., 2005), pp. 213-225
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321558
Page Count: 13
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The Presentist's Dilemma
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Abstract

This paper defends three theses: (i) that presentism is either trivial or untenable; (ii) that the debate between tensed and tenseless theories of time is not about the status of presentism; and (iii) that there is no temporal analogue of the modal thesis of actualism.

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