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Who Is Afraid of Epistemology's Regress Problem?

Scott F. Aikin
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 126, No. 2 (Nov., 2005), pp. 191-217
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321653
Page Count: 27
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Who Is Afraid of Epistemology's Regress Problem?
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Abstract

What follows is a taxonomy of arguments that regresses of inferential justification are vicious. They fall out into four general classes: (A) conceptual arguments from incompleteness, (B) conceptual arguments from arbitrariness, (C) ought-implies-can arguments from human quantitative incapacities, and (D) ought-implies can arguments from human qualitative incapacities. They fail with a developed theory of "infinitism" consistent with valuational pluralism and modest epistemic foundationalism.

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