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A Berry and a Russell without Self-Reference

Keith Simmons
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 126, No. 2 (Nov., 2005), pp. 253-261
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321656
Page Count: 9
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A Berry and a Russell without Self-Reference
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Abstract

In this paper I present two new paradoxes, a definability paradox (related to the paradoxes of Berry, Richard and König), and a paradox about extensions (related to Russell's paradox). However, unlike the familiar definability paradoxes and Russell's paradox, these new paradoxes involve no self-reference or circularity.

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