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Contingently Existing Propositions?

Patrick Toner
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 129, No. 3 (Jun., 2006), pp. 421-434
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321769
Page Count: 14
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Contingently Existing Propositions?
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Abstract

It is fairly common, among those who think propositions exist, to think they exist necessarily. Here, I consider three arguments in support of that conclusion. What I hope to show is not that that claim is false, but, rather, that the arguments used in its defense tend to presuppose a certain kind of approach to modality: a roughly Plantingian view. What the arguments show, then, is that one cannot accept that approach to modality and accept contingently existing propositions. But there are other approaches to modality - I discuss three such approaches - into which contingently existing propositions fit perfectly well. This suggests that disputes over, for example, singular propositions, must be conducted within a broader agreement over modal matters if they are to be at all productive.

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