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Prospects for Epistemic Compatibilism

Sven Bernecker
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 130, No. 1, Epistemic Virtues and Virtue Epistemology (Jul., 2006), pp. 81-104
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321790
Page Count: 24
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Prospects for Epistemic Compatibilism
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Abstract

This paper argues that Sosa's virtue perspectivism fails to combine satisfactorily internalist and externalist features in a single theory. Internalism and externalism are reconciled at the price of creating a Gettier problem at the level of "reflective" or second-order knowledge. The general lesson to be learned from the critique of virtue perspectivism is that internalism and externalism cannot be combined by bifurcating justification and knowledge into an object-level and a meta-level and assigning externalism and internalism to different levels.

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