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NAUKA SAMEGO BUDDY CZY PÓŹNIEJSZY JEJ ROZWÓJ?
Roczniki Filozoficzne / Annales de Philosophie / Annals of Philosophy
Vol. 16, No. 1, PHILOSOPHIE DE L'ÊTRE ET DE LA CONNAISSANCE / FILOZOFIA TEORETYCZNA (1968), pp. 37-42
Published by: John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Philosophy and the Learned Society of the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/43406923
Page Count: 6
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It is generally known that Buddhist philosophy does not admit the substantiality of empirical things: both the physical and psychical things are ultimately composed of fleeting elements (dharma). This doctrine is already contained in the earlier Buddhist canon, the pāli canon, and is put in the mouth of the Buddha himself. In this article we are concerned with the nonsubstantiality of the soul. Is the nonsubstantiality of the soul really the teaching of the Buddha himself, or is it perhaps a later evolution of his doctrine? The orthodox Buddhist standpoint is that the nonsubstantiality of the soul is the teaching of the Buddha himself. The Western scholars generally maintain the same traditional standpoint. Between the two World Wars a different opinion was put forward, the representative of which in Poland was the well known scholar, Stanislaw Schayer: the Buddha himself taught the substantiality of the soul; nonsubstantiality of the latter is a later evolution of his doctrine, accomplished (for „soteriological” reasons) by Ceylonese monks, and imputed to the Buddha in the pali canon. This opinion is somewhat boldly expressed by St. Schayer in the collective work Religie Wschodu. However, this critical theory and its arguments are not generally accepted. Author's conclusion is as follows: Although this critical theory is not generally accepted, its representative, St. Schayer, est benigne interpretandus; from this theory we should learn not to be too naīve in respect to the pāli canon or to the mahāyānasūtra: we should keep reserve as to the question what the teaching of the Buddha himself is and rather talk of the teaching of hinayāna and mahāyāna buddhism on the basis of their respective sources.
Roczniki Filozoficzne / Annales de Philosophie / Annals of Philosophy © 1968 John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin President Vice-Rector, rev. prof. dr. hab. Andrzej Derdziuk